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“BUY ONE GET ONE FREE”: HOW REINDICTMENT
POLICIES PERMIT EXCESSIVE SEARCHES
Katie Carroll*
INTRODUCTION
When the government decides to stop prosecuting a case, it files a nolle prosequi
with the court.1 Nolle prosequis are slightly different from motions to dismiss. Unlike
a motion to dismiss with prejudice,2 a prosecutor may later reindict a defendant with
the same crime without a double jeopardy issue arising after dropping the same case
through nolle prosequi.3 Furthermore, many states do not require judicial approval
for a nolle prosequi.4 Therefore, prosecutors can gain a number of advantages by
using nolle prosequi, like avoiding speedy trial deadlines or having a second chance
to win important evidentiary hearings.5
The advantages of nolle prosequi, however, can also extend to the police. Be-
cause police will need to rearrest the defendant following a reindictment, they can
conduct a new search of the defendant at the time of the arrest. Since the defendant
is being rearrested, the police have an arrest warrant.6 This makes any search sub-
stantially more likely to be found constitutional because the arrest warrant gives the
police probable cause for any search incident to arrest; the police therefore do not need
a reasonable suspicion to search the defendant normally required for a traditional
*  JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School. I would like to specially thank Sebastian
Brana and the Norfolk Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia for their
assistance with this Note.
1 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption; 22A C.J.S.
Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 280 (2019) (“The nolle prosequi of a charging
document (or of a count) constitutes a final disposition of that particular charging document
or count, and there can be no further prosecution under the nol prossed charging document or
count unless the nolle prosequi is subject to a condition that is later violated. Subject to dis-
missal on other grounds, the entry of a nolle prosequi causes the matter to lie dormant unless
(and until) the prosecutor elects to proceed on a new indictment, information or other charging
document. Thus, the state’s dismissal of a case by nolle prosequi does not bar a later prose-
cution.” (internal citations omitted)).
2 FED R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
3 See 22A C.J.S. Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 280.
4 See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
5 See discussion infra Section IV.B.
6 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 9(a).
1107
1108 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:1107
stop-and-frisk search.7 Furthermore, searches incident to arrest are substantially
more invasive than stop-and-frisk searches.8
Allowing prosecutors to file motions for nolle prosequi can create an evidentiary
loophole where a defendant is charged with a separate crime that was only discov-
ered through the second arrest, that the defendant could never be convicted of initially.9
For example, a defendant could initially be arrested for a crime that is only supported
by inadmissible evidence. After the defendant wins a motion to suppress that inad-
missible evidence, the prosecutor drops the case, and later recharges the defendant
with the same crime.10 When the police go to rearrest the defendant, they find evidence
of a new, separate crime while searching through his possessions. The defendant can
now be charged with two crimes. Although the initial crime, which the defendant
was rearrested for, remains solely supported by inadmissible evidence, the new
crime is not. Because the evidence supporting the second crime was found through
a search following a valid arrest warrant, the search is also valid.11 Therefore, the evi-
dence supporting the second crime was legally obtained and can be used to prose-
cute the defendant.12 Furthermore, since the defendant is substantially likely to be
convicted of the second crime, the prosecutor can now drop the original case because
the evidence supporting the first crime is likely to be suppressed again.13
It is difficult to determine how frequently this loophole is being used. These
types of searches are not typically appealed because there is no legal argument to
support an appeal.14 However, reindictments are used frequently by the criminal
justice system.15
7 See generally Annotation, Right of Search and Seizure Incident to Lawful Arrest
Without a Search Warrant, 82 A.L.R. 782 (2019) (describing in detail many cases wherein
searches are broadened significantly because of the context of a specific arrest).
8 See discussion infra Section III.C.
9 See Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 393 (Ind. 1997); discussion infra Section I.B; see
also discussion infra Part III. See generally United States v. Saruis, 560 F.2d 494 (2d Cir.
1977) (illustrating the extent of a search incident to arrest).
10 See, e.g., Joseph A. Thorp, Nolle-and-Reinstitution: Opening the Door to Regulation
of Charging Powers, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 429, 433 (2016). For an explanation on the
history of the prosecutor’s power to nolle pros, see generally Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR.
REV. 1, 19 (2009).
11 Cf. Thorp, supra note 10, at 430.
12 See generally Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (highlighting the extent
the Court is willing to admit evidence).
13 Cf. id.
14 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
15 A simple search of news articles using the word “reindictment” returns dozens of
recent and ongoing cases where the prosecution reindicted the defendant. See, e.g., Lorraine
Longhi, Scottsdale Schools’ Ex-CFO Reindicted on 12 Felony Charges of Fraud, Conflicts
of Interest, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local
/scottsdale-education/2019/01/28/scottsdale-unified-school-district-ex-cfo-laura-smith-re
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Although nolle prosequi creates a plethora of prosecutorial advantages, as well
as granting police another search via rearrest, little has been done to restrict it.16 Most
jurisdictions have created a rule requiring the prosecutor to get judicial approval to
drop a case via nolle prosequi;17 however, this addresses the problem at the wrong
stage. Courts are less likely to be critical of prosecutors when charges are being
dropped because the government does not violate a defendant’s rights by dropping
charges and dropping charges lightens the burden of a busy docket.18 Instead, the
courts should be more critical of rearresting a defendant.
This Note examines the problems inherent in the current nolle prosequi stan-
dards. First, it explains why nolle prosequi was created, as well as its advantages and
disadvantages.19 Next, it considers the scope of police searches and how they are
expanded through searches incident to arrest.20 This Note then examines the current
safeguards put in place to limit prosecutorial misconduct and why they fail.21
Finally, it proposes some possible solutions to correct the inherent problems within
nolle prosequi.22
I. PROSECUTORS MAY DROP A CASE VIA NOLLE PROSEQUI
Nolle prosequi is the “usual method of dismissing an indictment or stopping a
criminal prosecution at common law.”23 Nolle prosequi can be defined as a “voluntary
withdrawal by the prosecuting authority of present proceedings on a particular bill.”24
indicted-12-felony-charges/2701431002/ [https://perma.cc/E48K-VFHB]; Mark Reagan, Second
Arrest Made in Medicaid Fraud Re-Indictment, MONITOR (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.the
monitor.com/2019/09/01/second-arrest-made-medicaid-fraud-re-indictment/ [https://perma.cc
/R6BQ-NPHW]; Julia Tullos, $1.5 Million Bond for Suspect Charged in Triple Murder on
Cleveland’s West Side, CLEVELAND19 NEWS (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.cleveland19
.com/2019/12/13/million-bond-suspect-charged-triple-murder-clevelands-west-side/
[https://perma.cc/PN9U-KHZ2]; Jon Wilcox, Lavaca County Grand Jury Hands Down Murder,
Arson, Corpse Tampering Indictments for Former Victoria County Jailer, VICTORIA ADVOC.
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.victoriaadvocate.com/counties/lavaca/lavaca-county-grand
-jury-hands-down-murder-arson-corpse-tampering/article_abbe4e9a-0fca-11ea-a9bf-bfdd
dbe19cfa.html [https://perma.cc/94EJ-TJMQ].
16 See Thorp, supra note 10, at 430–31 (describing how the historical evolution of
modern prosecution laid the ground work for many of the modern issues with prosecutorial
forum shopping and harassing prosecutions).
17 See infra note 189 and accompanying text. But see infra note 188 and accompanying text.
18 See Thorp, supra note 10, at 461.
19 See infra Section I.A.
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part IV.
22 See infra Part V.
23 Annotation, Power of Court to Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss Prosecution, 69
A.L.R. 240, § 1 (1930).
24 Id. (quoting 2 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1310, at
1770 (10th ed. 1918)).
1110 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:1107
Congress codified nolle prosequi under Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.25 The rule states: “The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an
indictment, information, or complaint. The government may not dismiss the prose-
cution during trial without the defendant’s consent.”26 This allows prosecutors to
drop cases they do not want to take to trial.
A prosecutor can only file a motion for nolle prosequi before a trial has com-
menced because once it has begun, “the defendant has a right to insist on a disposition
on the merits and may properly object to the entry of a nolle prosequi.”27
Once a prosecutor drops a case by nolle prosequi, he can later reinstate the same
charges against the same defendant.28 “Nolle-and-reinstitution” gives prosecutors a
number of strategic advantages, including: “shop[ping] for better forums, dodg[ing]
discovery sanctions, evad[ing] trial court orders, circumvent[ing] speedy trial limita-
tions, and coerc[ing] guilty pleas.”29 However, nolle-and-reinstitution is a necessary
part of the criminal justice system.30 “A blanket prohibition against reinstitution
would unjustifiably reward the robber and harm society. It might also encourage
prosecutors to persist in prosecutions without hope of conviction as a way of keeping
the defendant in custody.”31
A. Why Nolle Prosequi Exists in the First Place
The history of nolle prosequi can be traced back to sixteenth-century England,
where it “was a procedural device that the royally appointed Attorney General could
use to terminate an ongoing criminal prosecution.”32 The Attorney General used
nolle prosequi to dismiss frivolous prosecutions or prosecutions that were contradic-
tory to royal interests.33 Historically, most criminal prosecutions were initiated and
managed by private citizens in England.34 Therefore, the nolle prosequi was the
“only form of ‘prosecutorial discretion’ exercised by a public figure.”35 This power
acted as a check against criminal claims made by private citizens.36
American prosecutors, however, used nolle prosequi to terminate prosecutions
that they originally brought.37 Therefore, in America nolle prosequi is “one of many
25 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
26 Id.
27 FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) advisory committee’s note to 1944 adoption.
28 Krauss, supra note 10, at 7 n.30; Thorp, supra note 10, at 430.
29 Thorp, supra note 10, at 430.
30 See id. at 438.
31 Id.
32 Krauss, supra note 10, at 16.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 17.
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procedural devices that public officials used to control criminal prosecutions.”38
Justice Marshall argued that the administering of criminal judgment was a duty of
the government: “It is a duty to be performed at the demand of the nation, and with
which the nation has a right to dispense.”39
There are some common-sense reasons demonstrating the necessity for nolle
prosequi. For example, if police find evidence that conclusively rules out a defen-
dant from having committed a crime, there is no reason to go to trial. It would be
both a waste of money and a miscarriage of justice to put an innocent person in
jeopardy of going to jail. Nolle prosequi allows prosecutors to end the case instead
of waiting for the defendant to file a motion to dismiss. Because a prosecutor under-
stands the state’s argument better than the defense, he is in a better position to know
that there is not enough evidence to go to trial. Ultimately, it is better that he dismisses
the case without forcing the defense attorney to write a motion to dismiss and have
the judge rule on the motion.
Conversely, the modern nolle prosequi does not allow courts to dismiss a case
with prejudice and therefore bar the prosecutor from reindicting the defendant for
the same charges based on the same fact pattern.40 Filing for a motion to dismiss is
superior to a nolle prosequi for a defendant because the judge can permanently dis-
miss the case.41 Because the prosecutor can move to reinstate the case, a nolle prose-
qui does not give the defendant the same peace of mind that a motion to dismiss
with prejudice does.
Although reindicting a case after a nolle prosequi is sometimes a justifiable
necessity, it does not mean that this prosecutorial power should be left unregulated.42
The Supreme Court has heard several cases involving reinstatement after nolle prosequi
but has never truly addressed this use of power directly, instead focusing on behavior
of specific prosecutors.43 As a result, “the Court has not only failed to meaningfully
regulate nolle-and-reinstitution, it has also failed to identify nolle-and-reinstitution
as an adversarial charging power problem.”44
B. Prosecutorial Advantages to Nolle Prosequi
There are a number of advantages that a prosecutor can gain by nolle prosses a case
and later reindicting. Because prosecutors can reinstate a case later, they essentially
have the ability to “reset” a case should the prosecution be at a disadvantage for trial.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 18 (quoting 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 615 (1800)).
40 Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(a).
41 See discussion supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
42 Thorp, supra note 10, at 438.
43 Id. at 451–52.
44 Id. at 451.
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Nolle prosequi therefore allows prosecutors “to shop for a litigation advantage, such
as a better judge or a more favorable jurisdiction.”45
Furthermore, the prosecution can control the timing of the criminal charge by
resetting the trial whenever the prosecutors nolle prosses a case.46 This is one of the
more common reasons a prosecutor might maliciously use nolle prosequi, to grant
himself an unauthorized continuance.47 Through delaying the case, the prosecutor can
accomplish a series of goals, including: “locat[ing] an essential witness, punish[ing]
a defendant for demanding a trial, or coerc[ing] a plea bargain.”48
When a charge is reindicted, any ruling from the original case does not carry
over to the new cases: “The dismissal ‘free[s] the proceedings of the unfavorable
ruling,’ so that the issue in contention can ‘be reargued before a different judge with
the chance that this new judge might be persuaded by the prosecutor’s argument.’”49
Therefore, any motions that would put the prosecution at a disadvantage can be
relitigated without the finality of a binding appellate doctrine.50
For example, in Joyner v. State, the court held that because rulings on pretrial
motions are “not necessarily final,” a decision on a motion in the original case does
not preclude the reindictment court from making an individual decision on the same
issue and coming to the opposite conclusion.51 In that case, prosecutors initially tried
Joyner for murder in the county where the victim’s body was found.52 The original
court granted Joyner’s motion to suppress a video of the police interrogating him.53
After the motion to suppress, the State dismissed the case, which was then refiled
in the county where Joyner lived.54 Joyner again filed a motion to suppress the video;
however, the second court denied the motion to suppress.55 The Supreme Court of
Indiana held that because Joyner never went to trial, double jeopardy did not attach,
and, therefore, “the State’s dismissal of criminal charges does not preclude it from
refiling and prosecuting a charge for the identical offense.”56 Because the prosecu-
tion was able to get this evidence in, Joyner was ultimately found guilty of murder.57
45 Id. at 439.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 440 (footnotes omitted).
49 Id. at 441 (quoting People v. Walls, 324 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)).
50 Id. (“In contrast, the outcome of an appeal would be binding in the case at bar and might
establish precedent for future cases. Little wonder then that prosecutors prefer to take their
chances on finding a better forum.”).
51 678 N.E.2d 386, 393 (Ind. 1997).
52 Id. at 388–89.
53 Id. at 393.
54 Id. at 388.
55 Id. at 393.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 388–89. Joyner’s conviction was ultimately overturned for unrelated reasons—the
trial court excluded relevant evidence that implicated another person of the murder. Id. at 390.
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The United States Supreme Court has created a presumption that prosecutors acted
in good faith stemming from a long line of cases.58 “This presumption ‘supports . . .
prosecutorial decisions and, “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts
presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.”’ This presumption
of regularity all but guarantees that defendants’ challenges to inquisitorial charging
powers will fail.”59
All of these advantages, however, occur within a courtroom after the reindict-
ment. Because the defendant needs to be rearrested following a reindictment the
prosecution, by extension of the police, gains a completely separate advantage in the
rearrest, which can lead to new evidence discovered that would strengthen the original
charge or potentially lead to a separate, unrelated charge. In both of these instances,
the evidence gathered is likely admissible because an arrest warrant broadens the
scope of a warrantless search.
II. HOW A DEFENDANT IS REARRESTED
A. Nolle Prosequi Circumvents Protections Provided by Arrest Warrants
Following a nolle prosequi, if the prosecution wants to retry the case, they will
have to secure an arrest warrant and rearrest the defendant.
The Fourth Amendment, as interpreted in Coolidge v. New Hampshire by the
Supreme Court, requires that an arrest warrant be issued by “a neutral and detached
magistrate.”60 An arrest warrant can be issued by a grand jury’s finding that probable
cause existed for an indictment.61 If there is no grand jury indictment, an arrest war-
rant may still be issued if there is an adequate basis for finding probable cause on
the face of the criminal complaint pursuant to which an arrest warrant is issued.62
58 Thorp, supra note 10, at 465–66 (first citing United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S.
1, 6 (1926); then citing United States v. Nix, 189 U.S. 199, 205 (1903); then citing United
States v. Page, 137 U.S. 673, 679–80 (1891); and then citing Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. 92,
108 (1873)).
59 Thorp, supra note 10, at 466 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(1996)); see Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 276–78
(2001) (“[C]ourts restrict defendants’ challenges [to the use of prosecutorial discretion] and
employ a standard of review that is favorable to prosecutors. . . . ‘The prosecutor’s decision
to institute criminal charges is the broadest and least regulated power in American criminal law.
The judicial deference shown to prosecutors generally is most noticeable with respect to the
charging function. . . . [T]he charging decision is virtually immune from legal attack.’”).
60 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
61 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 487 (1958).
62 Id.
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However, regardless of whether the grand jury has indicted the defendant or if there
is a presumption of probable cause, the arrest warrant requirement remains.63
In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the authority
to issue arrest warrants does not need to “reside exclusively in a lawyer or judge.”64 In
that case, a clerk of the municipal court was authorized to issue arrest warrants for
people charged with breaching municipal ordinances.65 The Supreme Court upheld this
practice because it was consistent with the constitutional requirement that: “[A]n issu-
ing magistrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached, and he must
be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or
search.”66 The clerk is neutral and detached when “he is removed from prosecutor or
police and works within the judicial branch subject to the supervision of the municipal
court judge.”67 Furthermore, a clerk of the court is capable of making the relatively sim-
ple judgments called for in municipal ordinance cases, such as “whether there was
probable cause to believe a citizen guilty of impaired driving, breach of peace, drunken-
ness, trespass, or the multiple other common offenses covered by a municipal code.”68
The test established in Shadwick is used to determine who can issue an arrest
warrant.69 Obviously, police officers and prosecuting attorneys do not meet the
Shadwick test.70 That being said, in some cases, the prosecutor does become involved
in the warrant-issuance process before the arrest warrant is presented to the judge.71
However, if a warrant request has been signed by a prosecutor but was not actually
reviewed by him, it “should not affect the independent review undertaken by the
judicial officer.”72 Therefore, this prosecutorial interference does not invalidate the
arrest warrant if it is later issued by a judge.73
It should be noted that “[i]f an arrest is made pursuant to a previously issued
arrest warrant, it does not necessarily follow that the arrest is valid. For one thing,
an arrest may not be made pursuant to the warrant if in the interim the police learn
of additional information exculpatory in nature.”74
In Whiteley v. Warden, the Supreme Court held an arrest was unlawful only after
finding that the arrest warrant was found defective and that the arresting officers were
63 United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1977).
64 407 U.S. 345, 349 (1972); see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.1(h) (5th ed. 2018).
65 Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 345.
66 Id. at 350.
67 Id. at 351.
68 Id.
69 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 5.1(h).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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not independently possessed of facts amounting to probable cause.75 This is because
“[w]here probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists, the arrest is not invalidated
because it was made pursuant to a warrant that turned out to be invalid.”76
In cases of reinstatement, particularly if the defendant was initially arrested with
a warrant, the “presumption of probable cause” is not hard to find.77 The police were
already able to successfully arrest the defendant and the prosecution was able to bring
charges. Even in cases where the charges were nolle prossed after evidence favor-
able to the prosecution was suppressed, the suppression would not affect the validity
of a warrant.78 Therefore, there is little protection for defendants at the rearrest stage.
III. NOLLE PROSEQUI OPENS DEFENDANTS TO A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
Following an arrest warrant, the police proceed to arrest the defendant. During
the arrest, the police conduct a search incident to arrest. Depending on the location
of the defendant, that search can include: the clothes he is wearing,79 anything he is
carrying that is in arm’s reach,80 the room he is in or adjoining rooms,81 and his car.82
The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.83
This protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by police officers.84
However, the standard for what constitutes an improper search is different depending
on how and where the police perform it.85 Obviously, if the police obtain a valid search
warrant and conduct the search within the boundaries specified by the warrant, the
75 401 U.S. 560, 560 (1971).
76 United States v. Rose, 541 F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1976).
77 United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1977); see Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009) (explaining how the exclusionary rule is not triggered based off
of a bad warrant).
78 See generally Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386 (Ind. 1997).
79 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
80 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
81 Id.; see also Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
82 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
84 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967).
85 See discussion infra Section III.B; see also infra note 106.
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search is presumably constitutional.86 Similarly, having an arrest warrant also gives
the police more leeway in searching someone they have detained.87
Yet, the Supreme Court has held that an arrest warrant does not even have to be
valid for a search incident to arrest to be.88 In Herring v. United States, police arrested
Herring pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant in the neighboring county.89
Herring was arrested and a search incident to arrest found illegal guns and drugs.90
However, the warrant used to arrest Herring had been recalled five months earlier,
but the computer database had never been updated.91 Herring was ultimately charged
with illegal possession of guns and drugs based off of the search.92 He tried to sup-
press the search, arguing that the initial arrest was illegal because the warrant was
invalid.93 The trial court denied the motion to suppress, holding that the “officers
had acted in a good-faith belief that the warrant was still outstanding. Thus, even if
there were a Fourth Amendment violation, there was ‘no reason to believe that
application of the exclusionary rule here would deter the occurrence of any future
mistakes.’”94 The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision stating:
When a probable-cause determination was based on reasonable
but mistaken assumptions, the person subjected to a search or
seizure has not necessarily been the victim of a constitutional
violation. The very phrase “probable cause” confirms that the
Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision. And
whether the error can be traced to a mistake by a state actor or
some other source may bear on the analysis. For purposes of
deciding this case, however, we accept the parties’ assumption
that there was a Fourth Amendment violation. The issue is whether
the exclusionary rule should be applied.95
This holding is particularly significant in cases that are later reindicted after a nolle
prosequi. Even if a court ultimately held that a rearrest was invalid, as long as the
police believed that they were conducting a valid arrest, any evidence obtained
through the search is admissible and can be used to prosecute a separate crime.96
86 See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979).
87 See generally Gant, 556 U.S. 332.
88 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136–37 (2009).
89 Id. at 137.
90 Id. at 138.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 139.
96 Cf. id.
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A. Standard for a Search Incident to Arrest
In Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court held that:
[W]hen an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that
the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. . . . [and] to search for and seize any evidence on the ar-
restee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.97
However, the Court did not address why police have a wider scope for their search
in Chimel.98
In other words, the Court did not answer whether on the one hand,
the right to make such searches of the person flows automati-
cally from the fact that a lawful arrest was made, or whether, on
the other hand, such searches may be undertaken only when the
facts of the individual case indicate some likelihood that either
evidence or weapons will be found.99
Instead, it took until United States v. Robinson for the Supreme Court to determine
that a “custodial arrest” permits a “full search of the person” with “no additional
justification.”100 The police may use the search incident to arrest to search for “(i)
fruits, instrumentalities or other evidence of the crime, or (ii) a weapon or other im-
plement which could be used to escape from custody.”101
Therefore, police do not need a search warrant if they are arresting someone
with an arrest warrant.102 In Agnello v. United States, the Court noted: “The right
without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested
while committing crime . . . in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime . . . as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody is
not to be doubted.”103
That is not to say that there are not limitations on a search incident to arrest.
There must be probable cause that the objects implicating the arrestee are on his
97 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (citation omitted).
98 Id. at 762–63, 765.
99 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 5.2.
100 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 5.2(b).
101 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 5.2(b).
102 But see Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (holding that the police may
not conduct warrantless searches of third parties homes to apprehend the subject of an arrest
warrant, absent consent or exigent circumstances).
103 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
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person.104 Furthermore, when searching the immediate vicinity of the place of arrest,
the search must extend only so far as is necessary to find the implicating objects.105
“[A] search may be incidental to an arrest ‘only if it is substantially contemporaneous
with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.’”106 However,
it is difficult to define what exactly constitutes the “immediate vicinity.”107
B. Breadth of Search Incident to Arrest
1. Search on the Person
The Supreme Court has been very clear that the police have the right to search
anyone’s person incident to arrest.108 In Carroll v. United States, the Court explained:
“When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person
or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to
prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.”109
However, this right has been expanded to objects near the arrestee at the time
of the arrest. In Northrop v. Trippett, the defendant had a duffle bag on his shoulder
and placed it on the floor when a police officer approached him.110 The Sixth Circuit
found that the officers did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights by
searching his bag because a search incident to arrest allows police officers to search
a bag even if that bag is no longer accessible to the defendant at time of the
search.111 The court held that “[s]o long as the defendant had the item within his
immediate control near time of his arrest,” the search is valid under a search incident
to arrest exception.112
Northrop illustrates the extent of a search incident to arrest. In that case, the
defendant could no longer remove anything from his bag when he was arrested.113
Therefore, there was no risk to the officer that the defendant could have harmed him
with something within the bag.114 Additionally, the court found that being within the
104 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 5.2(b).
105 Id.
106 V.G. Lewter, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule as to Validity of Nonconsensual Search
and Seizure Made Without Warrant After Lawful Arrest as Affected by Lapse of Time Between,
or Difference in Places of, Arrest and Search, 19 A.L.R. 3d 727, § 3 (2018) (quoting Stoner
v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964)).
107 Id.
108 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 5.2(b).
109 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
110 265 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2001).
111 Id.
112 Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461–62 n.5 (1981) (upholding the search
of a jacket located in the vehicle where defendant sat just prior to his arrest)).
113 See id.
114 See id.
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proximity of the bag, that the defendant could not access during the arrest, was
enough to justify a search.115
2. Search Within a Residence
For a search of a residence to be considered a search incident to arrest, it must
be limited to “the area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.”116
Moreover, in order for a search of a residence to be incidental to the arrest, the
arrest must take place within the residence.117 Conversely, a search of a residence is
not incidental to arrest if the arrest was made outside of the residence, regardless of
how soon after the arrest the search was made.118 This extends even to an arrest
made just outside of the residence, unless there are “particular circumstances tending
to associate the residence with the arrest or the crime for which the arrest is made.”119
However, there are conflicting cases involving a search of a residence when an
arrest occurred on the premises, like in the yard, driveway, or porch.120 Similarly, there
is some debate when an arrest was made inside a building, like hotels or apartment
buildings, but not within the arrestee’s room or apartment.121
When the police arrest a person within his residence, some courts have still
limited the right to search the entire house.122 However, other courts have extended
a search incident to arrest to include nearby closets, adjacent rooms, the yard or
garage, and in some cases, even the entire residence.123 Therefore, the outer limits
of a residential search have not yet been fully established.124
For example, in United States v. Patterson, the police had an arrest warrant for
Patterson’s wife and, during the arrest, the police found a folder in a partially opened
kitchen cabinet that was four to six feet away from where she was standing.125 Spe-
cifically, the wife was in between the kitchen/dining room area and the living room.126
The folder contained a safe deposit key that belonged to someone whose apartment
had been burglarized and whose safe deposit box had been accessed.127 Patterson
was charged with intent to commit larceny in a bank and taking of money from a
115 Id.
116 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
117 See Lewter, supra note 106, § 16.
118 Id.
119 Id. § 3.
120 Id. § 26.
121 Id. § 27.
122 Id. § 18.
123 Id. §§ 20–21.
124 Id. §§ 18–21.
125 447 F.2d 424, 425 (10th Cir. 1971).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 425–26.
1120 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28:1107
bank in excess of $100 with intent to steal using the key found from the kitchen cabi-
net.128 The Tenth Circuit held that the search and seizure was valid as an incident to
a lawful arrest because Patterson’s wife had access to the kitchen.129 Therefore, the
officer was justified in entering the kitchen in order to remove any weapons, and the
envelope was in the officer’s plain view.130
Similarly, in United States v. Mulligan, the Ninth Circuit held that a closet in
defendant’s house was within his immediate control.131 In that case, the police had
arrested the defendant, who was only wearing pajama shorts at the time, and then
took him to his bed so that he could get clothes.132 The court reasoned that the police
officer was justified in looking in the closet because the closet was an area where a
person might gain possession of a weapon, and Mulligan was sitting by it after being
arrested.133 However, unlike in Patterson, the defendant had twice attempted to get
clothes from the closet without police permission.134
In United States v. Ford, Ford was charged with a drug offense and for being
a felon in possession of firearm.135 Officers entered Ford’s mother’s apartment with
his arrest warrant.136 They arrested Ford in said apartment and searched the bedroom
immediately adjoining the hallway the officers arrested Ford in.137 The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the officers could seize a gun clip in plain view on the
floor of the bedroom, but they could neither lawfully search under the mattress nor
behind window shades.138 The court held that because these were not spaces from
which an attack could be immediately launched, and there were no exigent circum-
stances justifying a warrantless search of the bedroom, any evidence found under
the mattress or behind the shades was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
and was inadmissible as evidence.139 However, the court upheld the officers’ en-
trance of the bedroom the defendant was not in, and seizing the gun clip that was in
plain view as part of a protective sweep of the house.140
These three cases illustrate the scope of immediate proximity for a residential
search incident to arrest. Objects do not need to be within arms reach for them to be
searchable. Furthermore, they do not even need to be in the same room as the defen-
dant. United States v. Mulligan specifically illustrates how police can strategically
128 Id.
129 Id. at 427.
130 Id.
131 488 F.2d 732, 732 (9th Cir. 1973).
132 Id. at 734.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 56 F.3d 265, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
136 Id. at 267.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 270.
139 Id. at 270, 72.
140 Id. at 270.
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place an arrestee near an area they wish to search.141 This allows police to justify a
search incident to arrest in areas where they would not otherwise have the justifica-
tions to search.
3. Search in a Car
Courts have mostly held that the search of a car is not limited to when the arrestee
is actually arrested within the car.142 Generally, courts have held that searches are
valid “if the car is simply nearby when the arrest is made, or if the automobile is in
some manner associated with the arrest.”143 Furthermore, some courts have held that
there is no constitutional violation if there is a delay in searching the vehicle as long
as the police and arrestee remain with the car.144 However, there is some debate over
“whether an officer, remaining at the scene, may search the automobile shortly after
the arrested party has been taken away by another officer, or whether the officers
may leave the scene entirely and take the prisoner to jail before returning to conduct
the search of the automobile.”145
C. Searches Incident to Arrest Are More Invasive than the Terry Stop Standards
The Terry stop refers to a “stop-and-frisk” of a person when a police officer is
suspicious of the person’s activity, but does not have probable cause to actually search
the person.146 This search is narrowly tailored to permit a reasonable search of a person
for weapons to protect the police officer when the officer has reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.147 Because this standard is for
the officer’s safety, it applies regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the
individual for a crime.148 The officer does not need to be certain that the person is
armed.149 The Court looks at whether a “reasonably prudent man in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”150
Furthermore, the scope of a “frisk” must be limited to what is necessary to
detect a concealed weapon.151 As long as the frisk was within the permissible scope
141 Cf. 488 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1973) (describing the arrest of the defendant and how
the police maneuvered him around).
142 See Lewter, supra note 106, §§ 7–9 (internal citations omitted).
143 Id. § 3.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 26.
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and the police officer only patted down the defendant, the frisk is valid.152 Further-
more, the officer may only put his hand in the defendants’ pockets to remove weapons
that he discovered from the pat down.153
Under Terry v. Ohio, assuming the initial stop was lawful, the Eighth Circuit
held that for a stop to be legal, the detention must have been reasonably related to the
circumstances that created the police officer’s inference in the first place.154 There-
fore, a traffic stop can transform into an investigative stop, as long as the officer has
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that would expand his investigation, even if
his suspicions are unrelated to the traffic offense that served as the basis of the stop.155
In Adams v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that the permissible scope of a
frisk must be limited to what is necessary to protect an officer from a concealed
weapon.156 In Adams, the officer had been told by a reliable informant that Williams
was carrying a gun.157 When the officer went to Williams’ car and tapped on the car
window asking him to open door, he rolled down the window instead, justifying the
officer reaching into the car and removing a gun from Williams’ waist although it
had not been visible from outside the car.158
In United States v. Casado, the Second Circuit found that the district court erred
in denying defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence found in his pants pocket
during a Terry stop.159 In that case, a police officer reached into Casado’s pocket
without patting down the outside of the pocket first.160 The court held that Casado’s
refusal to remove his hand from his pocket was the only a reason to initiate a Terry
search.161 Furthermore, there was no evidence that a more intrusive alternative to
patting down a pocket would have been required in achieving the only stated ra-
tionale for the search: the officer’s physical safety.162
A stop-and-frisk search requires the officer to have probable cause to believe
that a crime is happening, about to happen, or just happened.163 Therefore, the Terry
standard is substantially less invasive than a search incident to arrest. Because the
nolle prosequi allows police to get a valid search warrant, the police already have
a much broader scope for what constitutes a valid search.
152 See id. at 30.
153 See id. at 29–30.
154 See United States v. Serena, 368 F.3d 1037, 1040–41 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that an
officer conducting a traffic stop could ask for license and registration among other things).
155 Id. at 1040.
156 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
157 Id. at 144–45.
158 Id. at 148.
159 303 F.3d 440, 441 (2d Cir. 2002).
160 Id. at 447.
161 Id. at 447–48.
162 Id. at 447.
163 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
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Furthermore, because the police officer is rearresting the defendant for the same
crime, it is substantially less likely that a defendant would be concealing evidence
of that crime. As such, the primary purpose of a search incident to a rearrest would
be for the officer’s safety.164 A stop-and-frisk pat down is the appropriate form of
search to solely protect an officer’s safety because it does not require the same level
of suspicion that a search incident to arrest would.165
Reindictment after a nolle prosequi leaves defendants in a particularly vulnera-
ble position. Because a reindictment requires the issuance of an arrest warrant,166 and
the de facto wider scope of a search incident to arrest,167 defendants are subjected
to a much more invasive search than a traditional stop-and-frisk. The arrest warrant
automatically creates probable cause, instead of the arresting officer having to
establish it independently.168
Furthermore, with an arrest warrant, police can decide when and where the
arrest happens, therefore creating the most favorable search conditions. For exam-
ple, if police believe that evidence can be located in a car, they can wait to pull over
the defendant, widening the search to include the car. This is especially concerning
if the police had previously been building a new case against the defendant for a
separate crime. The nolle prosequi gives the state access to information that it would
not have had without the arrest warrant for a separate case.
Finally, because police can collect evidence implicating the defendant of a sep-
arate crime, reindictment after a nolle prosequi encourages prosecutors to drop
weaker cases in bad faith, with the hope that a second arrest (and subsequent search)
will produce stronger evidence either for the original case or a new one. Therefore,
the combined prosecutorial powers of reindictment and nolle prosequi need to be
restricted more than they currently are to prevent prosecutors from manufacturing
conditions that allow police to more easily search defendants and their surroundings,
fishing for any criminal wrong-doings.
IV. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST NOLLE-AND-REINSTATE
There are several factors that do restrict the power of nolle prosequi and re-
indictment. However, they are fairly minimal and do not give the defendant enough
protection from abuses of this power.
A. Double Jeopardy Does Not Apply to Nolle Prosequi
The Fifth Amendment protects a person against being prosecuted for the same
crime twice: “No person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in
164 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969).
165 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 25–26.
166 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).
167 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); discussion supra notes 100–01.
168 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
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jeopardy of life or limb.”169 However, double jeopardy does not protect a person
from reindictment after nolle prosequi.170
The Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy does not attach until a trial
begins.171 However, there has been some debate over what constitutes the beginning
of a trial.172 The Court has stated that jury trials do not begin until the jury has been
“empaneled and sworn.”173 For bench trials, the Court has held that double jeopardy
does not attach until the court begins hearing evidence.174 Regardless, if a case is
nolle prosequi, it never reaches trial and is never protected by the Fifth Amendment.
This is what allows prosecutors to reindict a defendant.
B. Statutes of Limitations Do Not Do Enough to Protect Against Reindictment
Statutes of limitations restrict the time frame in which a defendant can be charged
with a crime; they only begin to run once a crime has been completed.175 Statutes of
limitations are designed to “represent legislative assessments of relative interests of
the State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice.”176 Statutes of
limitations are designed to promote fairness by “protect[ing] individuals from having
to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become ob-
scured by the passage of time.”177
Second, they are meant to improve efficiency by encouraging police to promptly
“investigate suspected criminal activity.”178 Ultimately, the rules further both par-
ties’ interests by making the “circumstances of prosecution more predictable.”179
In United States v. Marion, the Supreme Court has suggested that statutes of
limitations offer some protections against reindictment after a nolle prosequi.180
169 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
170 See Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 834 (2014) (citing Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28,
35 (1978)).
171 Id.
172 See id. at 839–41.
173 Id. at 839 (citing Crist, 437 U.S. at 35).
174 Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (citing McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d
640, 642 (10th Cir. 1936)).
175 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (citing Pendergast v. United States,
317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943)).
176 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971).
177 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 114; Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations,
45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 115–16 (2008).
178 Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115; Powell, supra note 177, at 116.
179 Powell, supra note 177, at 116.
180 404 U.S. at 317–18 (“The Court has pointed out that ‘[a]t the common law and in the
absence of special statutes of limitations the mere failure to find an indictment will not operate
to discharge the accused from the offense nor will a nolle prosequi entered by the Government
or the failure of the grand jury to indict.’ Since it is ‘doubtless true that in some cases the power
of the Government has been abused and charges have been kept hanging over the heads of
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However, this protection is primarily used to address the Sixth Amendment’s speedy
trial right by preventing prosecutors from using reindictments to “reset clock” on the
constitutional requirement.181 However, statutes of limitations were not “designed
to protect against the multifaceted harms of nolle-and-reinstitution.”182 Marion did
create a standard that would allow a defendant to argue that their rights were violated
due to pretrial delay.183 The defendant must prove that (1) the delay caused preju-
dice, precluding a fair trial, and (2) that the prosecution intentionally used said delay
to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant.184
However, not all states have enacted statutes of limitations.185 Additionally,
statutes of limitations have become less popular, resulting in blanket exceptions for
many crimes.186
Statutes of limitations limit the time frame in which a prosecutor could issue a
reindictment after a nolle prosequi. Regardless, “statutes of limitations fail to ade-
quately protect against nolle-and-reinstitution.”187 A pretrial delay claim might protect
some defendants from the original prosecution; however, any evidence uncovered
during a subsequent arrest would not be protected by a statute of limitation or an
undue delay because the secondary crime would be considered new.
C. Leave of the Court Requirements
There have been some attempts by the legislative branch in reigning in the prosecu-
tor’s powers derived from nolle prosequi. Although nineteen states still allow the
citizens, and they have been committed for unreasonable periods, resulting in hardship,’ the
Court noted that many States ‘[w]ith a view to preventing such wrong to the citizen . . . [and] in
aid of the constitutional provisions, National and state, intended to secure to the accused a speedy
trial’ had passed statutes limiting the time within which such trial must occur after charge or
indictment.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)); see United States v. McDonald, 456
U.S. 1, 8 (1982).
181 McDonald, 456 U.S. at 8.
182 Thorp, supra note 10, at 457.
183 404 U.S. at 324–25.
184 Id. at 324.
185 Thorp, supra note 10, at 457; see, e.g., Remmick v. State, 275 P.3d 467, 470 (Wyo. 2012).
186 Powell, supra note 177, at 124–28 (“Even against this backdrop of episodic change, the
recent fervor with which Congress has been carving out new exceptions to the general rule is
unusual. In contrast to the one or two exceptions created every few decades since the rule’s in-
ception, and even the unusual number of exceptions created in the 1950s, the past two decades
have seen about a dozen new exceptions to the rule, some of them quite sweeping. . . . [For
example,] Congress in 2001 eliminated the limitations period for any terrorist offense that
‘resulted in, or created a foreseeable risk of, death or serious bodily injury to another person.’
Congress explained the provision not with regard to the rationales and interests traditionally
understood to underlie limitations periods, but as a necessary step toward ‘[r]emoving impedi-
ments to effective prosecution’ of terrorists.” (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)).
187 Thorp, supra note 10, at 457.
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prosecutor to nolle prosequi without any limitation,188 thirty-one states have created
some restrictions on when a prosecutor can nolle prosequi, typically requiring the
leave of the court.189 Connecticut has the most defense-friendly standard where the
defendant must consent to the dismissal unless the state can show a material witness
cannot be found or that material evidence has disappeared or has been destroyed and
that a further investigation is therefore necessary.190
It appears the primary objective that requiring the leave of the court achieves is
that it protects a defendant against prosecutorial harassment.191 Under the jurisdic-
tions where leave of the court is required, a judge would perform a limited review
of the evidence to determine whether the defendant needs protection from prosecu-
torial harassment.192 To determine prosecutorial harassment, the court examines “the
propriety or impropriety of the Government’s efforts to terminate the prosecution—the
good faith or lack of good faith of the Government in moving to dismiss.”193 Histori-
cally though, any attempts to limit prosecutorial discretion have not been impactful.194
Judges rarely deny a prosecutor’s nolle prosequi.195 Case law has made prosecutorial
discretion unreviewable by grounding the power in a different political branch and
188 See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 43; DEL. SUP. CT. CRIM. R. 48; IND. CODE. § 35-34-1-13
(2015); ME. R. UNIFIED CRIM. P. 48; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 16; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 30.01; NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.085(7) (LEXISNEXIS 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-931 (WEST
2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22 § 815 (2015); R.I. SUPP. CT. R. CRIM. P. 48; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-44-2 (2016); VT. R. CRIM. P. 48; see also State v. Hurd, 739 So. 2d 1226, 1228
(Fla. Dis. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Williamson, 853 P.2d 56 (Kan. 1993); State v. Larce 807
So. 2d 1080, 1081–82 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Ward v. State, 427 A.2d 9008, 9092 (Md. 1981);
No rwood v. Drumm, 691 S.W. 2d 238, 238–39 (Mo. 1985); State v. Pond, 584 A.2d 770,
771 (N.H. 1990); State v. Heinsen, 121 P.3d 1040, 1048 (N.M. 2005); Mackey v. State, 595
S.E.2d 241, 242 (S.C. 2004); In re Brown, 363 S.E.2d 689, 689 (S.C. 1988).
189 See ALA. CODE § 15-8-130 (2018); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 16.4(a); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16
-85-713 (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1385–86 (2015); COLO. CRIM. P. 48(a); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 54–56b (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-3 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 806-56 (2016); IDAHO
CODE § 19-3504 (2018); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.33(1); KY. RCR. 9.64; MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 767.29 (2018); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-15-53 (2018); MONT. CODE § 46-13-401 (2015);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1606 (LexisNexis 2018); N.J. CT. R. 3:25-1(a); N.D. R. CRIM.
P. 48; OHIO REV. CODE § 2941.33 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (2018); PA. R. CRIM. P.
585; TENN. R. CRIM. P. 48(a); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 32.02 (2015); UTAH R. CRIM. P.
25(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-265.3(a) (2018); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 48; W. R. CR. P. 48(a).
190 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54–56b (2018).
191 Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n.15 (1977); see also Korematsu v. United States,
584 F. Supp. 1406, 1412 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (“The purpose of this limited review is to protect
against prosecutorial impropriety or harassment of the defendant and to assure that the public
interest is not disserved.”).
192 Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1412 (citing United States v. Cowen, 524 F.2d 504, 512–13
(5th Cir. 1975)).
193 United States v. Salinas, 693 F.2d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Rinaldi, 434 U.S. 22).
194 Krauss, supra note 10, at 25.
195 Id.
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making the question fall under the separation of powers instead of examining the
abuse of powers.196 This is not an irrational conclusion when examining the majority
of courts’ opinions discussing nolle prosequi; where courts have focused on “only
one particular consequence of reinstitution: delay.”197
D. Vindictive Prosecution Protections
Finally, courts have struck down some reindictments because prosecutors did
so vindictively. The doctrine of vindictive prosecution is designed to protect the
defendant from abusive prosecutions.198 Indeed:
The doctrine of vindictive prosecution is derived from the Due
Process Clause and exists to ensure that criminal defendants can
pursue their constitutional rights “without apprehension that the
State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the
original one.” The two elements necessary to establish a claim
of vindictive prosecution are: (1) the defendant must exercise
some right; and (2) the prosecutor must subsequently use her
charging powers to the defendant’s detriment. The Court consid-
ered whether there was bad faith or malice on the part of the
prosecutor; notably, the Court focused purely on the possibility
of prosecutorial vindictiveness.199
However, the Court has not applied the doctrine of vindictiveness to pretrial use of
prosecutorial powers, instead adopting a de facto presumption that protects pretrial
charging powers.200
The Supreme Court has predominantly focused on the vindictive use of prosecu-
torial powers for plea bargains. Referred to as “‘charge bargaining’. . . prosecutors
file a serious initial charge and then . . . offer the defendant a charge reduction in
exchange for a plea. Or, alternatively, prosecutors file a less serious initial charge
and then . . . threaten to file a more serious charge unless the defendant agrees to
plead guilty.”201 This strategy is used to encourage defendants to plead guilty instead
of going to trial, where the defendant will face substantially more severe charges.202
In the cases that the Supreme Court has addressed this abuse of discretion,203 the
196 Id.
197 Thorp, supra note 10, at 452.
198 Id. at 468.
199 Id. (citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1974)).
200 Id. at 469.
201 Id. at 469–70.
202 Id. at 470.
203 See generally United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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Court has upheld the prosecution using this power because it limits the amount of
trials in the system.204
There is an argument that the Court refuses to regulate prosecutorial abuse of
power because it would violate the separation of powers doctrine.205 Joseph A. Thorp
argued that this is because the Court has a fundamental misunderstanding of the
powers of the prosecutor.206 The Court has failed to distinguish between inquisitorial
charging power and adversarial charging power.207 Inquisitorial charging powers are
prosecutorial powers that occur before the indictment including “the authority to
decide what, if any, charges to file.”208 Judicial regulation of inquisitorial charging
powers is a separation of powers issue.209 However, adversarial powers can and
should be regulated by the judiciary.210 Adversarial charging powers are prosecutorial
powers after a defendant has been indicted.211 They include “the power to enhance,
reduce, dismiss, divert, and nolle-and-reinstitute a charge.”212 At this stage the prosecu-
tor is acting as the “party opponent” in an adversarial proceeding, where the judge
begins to make rulings.213
Thorp argued that because the Court has ignored this distinction, it gives
prosecutors plenary charging power regardless of when that
power is used. Nolle-and-reinstitution highlights this error in the
Court’s jurisprudence and demonstrates the need to differentiate
between the use of prosecutorial charging power in the
inquisitorial phase and its use in the adversarial phase. Nolle-and-
reinstitution presents a viable opportunity for the Court to exper-
iment with regulating the prosecution’s use of its adversarial
charging power.214
The combined powers of reindictment and nolle and prosequi are not an essen-
tial part of the criminal justice system in the way that plea bargaining is. Therefore,
204 See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 361–62 (“We have recently had occasion to observe.
‘Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea and the often
concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country’s criminal justice system.
Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned.’” (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71 (1977))).
205 Thorp, supra note 10, at 431.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 431–32.
211 Id. at 431.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 462 (footnote omitted).
2020] BUY ONE GET ONE FREE 1129
establishing a limit to the use of the power would not bring the system to a screech-
ing halt in the same way the Supreme Court worries limiting plea bargains would.215
Conversely, limiting reindictments and nolle and prosequi would lower the number
of cases the criminal justice system would need to review.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Regardless of the inability to properly enforce the leave of the court standard
found in both federal and state level rules of criminal procedure, these rules focus
too heavily on regulating the prosecutor’s ability to dismiss a case. The fact that the
Supreme Court is considering the practicality of limiting the scope of prosecutorial
power,216 demonstrates the reason why having judicial oversight at the dismissal
phase is ineffective.
Instead, the criminal justice system should make it more difficult to reindict a
person for the same crime. Nolle prosequi does not give the defendant the ability to
protect his own interests. Through a nolle prosequi, the defendant does not have the
option to request a dismissal with prejudice.217 Therefore, the defendant does not
have the chance to protect himself from being recharged with the same crime. Be-
cause the defendant does not have an opportunity to defend himself, the prosecutor
should have a higher burden if he wishes to reindict the defendant.
215 Id. at 469 n.208 (“The politics and pragmatics of the overburdened criminal system make
it unlikely that the Supreme Court will interfere with charge bargaining powers; limitations
on charge bargaining would threaten the entire plea bargaining system. As Professor William
Stuntz explained: ‘Plea bargaining took on increased importance as crime rates rose. By
1978, criminal dockets were rising, and prison populations were rising with them. Given the
massive increase in crime of the preceding generation, it was obvious that further increases
were coming. Both the number of felony prosecutions and the number of prison inmates more
than doubled in the dozen years after Bordenkircher. Rising caseloads were not accompanied
by rising prosecutorial budgets.’”).
216 See id. at 471 (“The Court acknowledged the potential for abuse of prosecutorial ad-
versarial charging powers but nevertheless refused to address it. To protect the plea bargaining
system, the Court simply pretended that prosecutors did not have carte blanche use of their
adversarial charging powers. And, while the Court insisted that, ‘there are undoubtedly con-
stitutional limits’ upon the exercise of that power, the constitutional ‘limits’ to which the Court
referred were wholly illusory: ‘It says something about the wide berth the judiciary has given
prosecutorial power that the leading case invalidating an exercise of prosecutorial discretion
is the nearly century-old decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.’ The result of this magical thinking
is an explicit blessing of the prosecutor’s practice of threatening increased punishment in
pursuit of a guilty plea.” (first quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); then
quoting James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1539 (1981))).
217 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54–56b (2018) (requiring that the defendant must consent
to the dismissal unless the state can show that a material witness cannot be found or that
material evidence has disappeared or has been destroyed and that a further investigation is
therefore necessary).
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This heightened standard could be very simple. The criminal justice system could
establish a burden that requires the prosecution to establish a reasonableness require-
ment for reindictment. This would not heavily burden cases where nolle prosequi
is properly used. In cases where the charges are changed by amending an informa-
tion or an indictment, prosecutors already have to get leave of the court and explain
what the change entails.218 In cases where additional evidence has been found, the
prosecutor would have a fairly easy explanation for why he wants to reinstate the
case, as would a prosecutor who has a new witness agreeing to testify. New evi-
dence can clarify who committed a crime and better build the prosecutor’s case.
Furthermore, this would better motivate courts to consider the reason why the
prosecution is reindicting the defendant. Because prosecutors would need to explain
the reason they are bringing a reindictment, it would better uncover vindictiveness on
their part. Therefore, having a review process at the reindictment stage easily resolves
many of the unfair prosecutorial advantages that come with reindicting a defendant after
a nolle prosequi without unnecessarily burdening the state in legitimate reprosecutions.
Some might argue that this added burden would discourage prosecutors from
dropping cases to begin with. Because it is more difficult to reindict a case, it is easier
to simply try the case the first time. However, many of the advantages that nolle prose-
qui provides prosecutors are unavailable during the initial prosecution. Furthermore,
undue delay, the primary concern of the courts when examining nolle prosequi cases,219
is better controlled by the court when the defendant is charged only once.
In addition, the defense would still have the opportunity to file for a motion to
dismiss should there not be enough evidence to convict the defendant. Therefore,
the court would still have a chance to review the validity of the case before going
to trial. This might encourage a prosecutor to better prepare for the case he has in-
stead of restarting the case through nolle prosequi to create the case he wanted.
Critics might also argue that having the court review a reindictment would
create a separation of powers issue. Because the Executive Branch is responsible for
enforcing laws, which would include choosing who to indict or reindict, the courts
should defer to the executive branch. However, a reindictment is different from an
initial indictment. The prosecutor has already had a chance to make a plea bargain
and bring the case. He has had a chance to present evidence at trial. The prosecution
chose to drop the case, which implies that it either did not have enough evidence to
properly try the case or, it did not want to try the case. Therefore, the prosecutor should
now have an obligation to demonstrate to the judiciary why the court should take the
time and energy to allow the case to be reheard.
Another possible solution to limit the power the prosecution has regarding nolle
prosequi would be granting the defendant a chance to file a motion to dismiss pursuant
to the prosecution issuing a nolle prosequi. This solution would likely involve the
least amount of change from the current system. Again, thirty-one states have a judicial
218 See Thorp, supra note 10, at 451.
219 See id. at 440.
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review requirement for issuing a nolle prosequi.220 However, this does not provide
the defendant an opportunity to speak, and possibly have the case dismissed with
prejudice. Because nolle prosequi can be used as a do-over by some prosecutors for
motions that were not decided in their favor, allowing defendants to file a motion
to dismiss alongside the prosecutor’s nolle prosequi could also help prevent prosecu-
torial misconduct,221 instead of requiring the defendant to challenge the reinstatement
by showing prosecutorial harassment, bad faith, or fundamental unfairness, which can
be difficult to show.222 Enacting rules, similar to the one in Connecticut,223 might
provide the defendant adequate protection from reindictment.
However, this solution would be applied during the dismissal of the case, and
not the reinstatement of the charge. Thus, it would not include the same protections
that requiring the prosecution to provide additional evidence for the reindictment
would. Again, a court might be less concerned about future injustices, and not consider
a defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice as seriously as it would a reindictment.
Requiring the prosecution to take on an additional burden when reindicting a defendant
would be the best method to protect defendants from being reindicted for crimes that
they could not be convicted of.
CONCLUSION
Nolle prosequi is a vital part of our criminal justice system. When used properly,
it allows the government to drop cases that it does not have sufficient evidence to
prove. This allows prosecutors to more efficiently use the limited resources they have,
reducing the number of cases that must be heard in court, and freeing defendants
from the anxiety of a potential criminal conviction.
Currently, however, the United States has given prosecutors too much control
over the reindictments after they have dismissed cases without proper judicial over-
sight. This has created a legal loophole that allows police officers to conduct additional
searches on defendants as they are rearrested for the original crime. Therefore, cases
can emerge where a defendant is only convicted of a crime found through a rearrest
of a crime the defendant could never have been convicted of.
Requiring prosecutors to provide additional evidence at the reindictment stage
would close this loophole. This requirement would force prosecutors to demonstrate
why the reindictment is necessary, and more importantly why the prosecutor is more
likely to successfully convict the defendant than when the defendant was originally
charged. Furthermore, this additional requirement would not substantially increase
the workload of judges or prosecutors; however, it will substantially protect the rights
and freedoms of defendants.
220 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
221 See Thorp, supra note 10, at 451.
222 See, e.g., State v. Allen, 837 A.2d 324, 327 (N.H. 2003).
223 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54–56b (2018).
